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Hijacking Bitcoin: Routing Attacks on Cryptocurrencies

Date: 2017-03-24
Author(s): Maria Apostolaki, Aviv Zohar, Laurent Vanbever

Link to Paper

As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (<100) BGP prefixes to isolate ~50% of the mining power---even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.

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submitted by dj-gutz to myrXiv [link] [comments]

Bitcoin Q&A: Exchanges, identity, and CoinJoins Technology Transitions - with Princeton professor and Obama advisor Ed Felten 64: Censursäkra toppdomäner och Ed Feltens röstmaskinshack TigerTalks on the Road: Blockchain, Cryptocurrencies and ICOs Bitcoin Exchange - Bitcoin Exchange Rate - Video

Joshua Kroll, Ian Davey, Ed Felten. WEIS 2013 JB. Price during 2013 JB. Black Markets Silk Road: US$14M in Revenue in 2012 [Christin 2012] Traveling the Silk Road: A measurement analysis of a large anonymous online marketplace Nicolas Christin, WWW 2013 JB. E-commerce. Bitcoin exchanges – buy and sell bitcoin using different currencies Beware the middleman: Empirical analysis of Bitcoin ... Ed Felten is co-founder and chairman of Offchain Labs, a company that specializes in fast, scalable smart contracts. But unlike many startup founders in the crypto space, Felten has spent decades analysing, advising and working in the technology industry. In that time he’s become the Robert E. Kahn Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs […] Bitcoin Exchange Files with US Treasury Regulatory Agency Mt. Gox in Japan has registered as a Money Services Business with the US government Institutions Take Record Bullish Bets in Bitcoin Futures, Shrugging Off Exchange Missteps. Omkar Godbole Oct 17 , 2020. Bitcoin 24h $ 11,704.33 +2.03%. Bitcoin 24h $ 11,704.33 +232.32 +2.03% ... limit my search to r/Bitcoin. use the following search parameters to narrow your results: subreddit:subreddit find submissions in "subreddit" author:username find submissions by "username" find submissions from "" url:text search for "text" in url selftext:text search for "text" in self post contents self:yes (or self:no) include (or exclude) self posts nsfw:yes (or ...

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Bitcoin Q&A: Exchanges, identity, and CoinJoins

Ed Felten is a Professor of Computer Science at Princeton University who served in the White House as Deputy Chief Technology Officer to President Obama. Felten is a co-founder at Offchain Labs ... Vi intervjuar hackaren och Princetonprofessorn Edward Felten om att hacka röstningsmaskiner, något som även deltagarna på Defcon i Las Vegas ägnade sig åt förra veckan. Ed Felten intervjuas ... L'Halving di Bitcoin è stato eseguito, ed il prezzo non è DUMPATO! Segnale Bullish? Diamo un'occhiata insieme ai grafici! Promo OkEX riservata alla nostra Community (30$ Bonus!): https://www ... Panoramica sui migliori servizi per comprare, vendere o scambiare crypto. Presentati in base al livello di esperienza che si ha. Testati personalmente. Ins... Edward W. Felten, Professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University, describes his experience in government, where he served as the first Chief Technologist at the Federal ...